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Political Economy of Secularism 
Rediscovery of Idia 
Nasir Tyabji 
As it was in Europe, secularism in India is an intrinsic part of the process of the emergence of a modern identity 
of the people of a multi-language and multi-ethnic society, the necessity for which is being continuously generated 
by industrialisation and urbanisation: The emergence of this identity, however, has been hampered by the failure at 
thepolitical evel: the inability to evolve political units appropriateforthe expression of regional aspirations, to entrench 
and extend the process of agrarian reforms, and to unify and modernise the systems of personal law, etc. 
IT is a stard procedure in discussions of 
Indian secularism to make an initial proviso: 
while in Europe the process of secularisation 
incorporated the process of the separation of 
the state from the church, this has not been 
so in India. Various interpretations usually 
follow of the philosophical basis for the 
Indianuseofthetermsecularism. Commonly, 
toe run along the lines of the statement that 
the state in India is committed to providing 
qualab t tm o tthe adherents ofall religious 
denominations, that it would be equidistant 
from all variants of religious belief and 
philosophy. 
The argument of this paper is that 
secularism in India (as, in fact, in Europe) 
is an intrinsic part of the process of giving 
shape to a modem identity for the people of 
a multi-language and multi-ethnic society, 
tiene cessityforwhich is beingcontinuously 
genated by the processes of industrialisation 
andurbanisation.Theprocessof seciularisation 
is therefore a component of the political 
economy of Indian development. The 
challenges, isses and prospects can all be 
best observed from an analysis of the relation- 
ship of secularism to post-independence 
developments in India's economy and polity, 
of ourse, to those aspects of these develop- 
ments which impinge more immediately on 
secularism. 
D D Kosambi's celebrated review of 
Nehru's Discovery of India was advisedly 
tded 'The Bourgeoisie Comes of Age in 
Mdik' [Kosambi 1946]. It signified that the 
leading ideologue of the independent Indian 
state had come to terms with the past, had 
produced a version of the process of cultural 
syntiesis underway in India which would be 
appropriate for the consolidation of Indian 
nationhood. Of course, the vision required 
elaboration and popularisation, but at the 
ideological level, these writings of Nehru 
were as significant as were the political 
programmes of the national movement- 
thus had the bourgeoisie truly come of age. 
Clearly, the vision incorporated a concept 
of the Indian nation and of the relationship 
between the distinct cultures (both regional 
and religious) of the peoples of India. 
Implicit in this was also a notion of the 
ways in which the state would relate to these 
cultures and their processes of interaction 
and change-this was effectively the cultural 
aspect of the secular Indian state.. 
Primary amongst these were steps 
towards political democratisatioti, by the 
formation of linguistic-national 'states as 
embodiments of subnational identity, and 
of autonomous regions where the identity 
of a concentration of the population, 
although not yet identifiably distinct, was 
achieving self-conscious political expression. 
So also were steps at decentralisation of 
political and administrative po.wer to elected 
panchayats. 
These steps were necessary for the 
movement forward. To preserve the basis of 
the advances already made it was essential 
to undertake agrarian reforms, in this context 
not on the grounds of equity but to prevent 
the uncertainties of tenure adding to those 
of physical agricultural operations on a 
precarious rainfed regime. In the area of 
agrarian reform, thus, there was need to 
protect tenants' rights,'to redistribute land 
surplus to prescribed ceilings, and, above all, 
to reduce the uncertainty caused by the 
physical environment by extending the reach 
of irrigation in the vast rainfed parts of the 
country. These conditions gave scope for the 
reinforcement of religiosity and prevented 
the consolidation of the "scientific temper".' 
One area critical for the consolidation of 
national consciousness was that of providing 
equal treatment to women and men through 
personal law reform. 
The state wa's also to be the instrument 
for transforming the consciousness of the 
people of India, for the formation of a 
secular society which would be distinguished 
by the fact that'problems-not only of the 
present and future, but of the past-would 
be analysed by the scientific approach. In 
line with this perspective, great emphas is 
was laid on the growth of higher education 
and its supporting infrastructural facilities. 
These, of course, already had their rationale 
in contributing to poverty eradication 
through industrial growth and income 
generation, generally. These steps were 
essential for the consolidation of secularism 
at the societal level, and even for its 
preservation within the state administration. 
In all these areas, the record has been poor. 
Theprerequisiteforpoliticaldecentralisation, 
the formation of linguistic states was 
grudgingly granted, in many cases only after 
mass protest movements. Actual devolution 
of power to the states has been absent, in spite 
of the impressive evidence, exemplified in 
the degeneration of subnational movements 
into separatist channels, that subnational 
identities can be effectively mobilised only 
if adequate power is available to the political 
representativesof thosecommunities aspinrng 
to subnational status. In spite of a great deal 
of discussion about the merits of the 
devolution of power to local levels, neither 
the institutions ofurban nor those of rural 
local government have had any substantial 
period of continuous functioning. 
The record in other areas has been little 
better: the performance in compulsory 
prirnary education is well known and this 
was to be a critical component for the initial 
inculcation of the scientific temper.2 
Similarly, except for the early post- 
independence abolition of zamindari, there 
has been no effective advance in the area 
of agrarian reform. The progress in the area 
of personal law, as with land reform and 
primary education, has not only been 
minimal but in some instances, as in the 
constitutional amendment following the 
Shah Bano case, been both short-sighted 
and reactionary. 
H 
All these tailures have expressed themselves 
in political forrn-extra constitutional in the 
case of separatist movements, and; 
constitutionally, in the slow but definite 
decline in the electoral support on which 
Congress governments of the post- 
independence period have been based. 
The vision presumed that with the attain- 
ment of independence and the acceptance 
of a republican Constitution, there would not 
only be a broad consensus on these 
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prerequitites for moving, under the aegis of 
a secular state, to a secular society, but that 
there wouldbe no processes in society which 
r&-,,ht work at odds with the secularising 
agenda. In the event, not only was there 
opposition to the principles underlying 
secularism, but these were given substantial 
weight by their articulation by sectarian 
political organisations, asserting the 
priority of religious identity as the national 
characteristic. These were essentially 
developtnents of the tendency of religious 
revivalism, which formed the basis for two 
of the competing conceptions of the national 
movement, the two-nation theory of the 
Muslim separatism and the Hindu rashtra 
theory of Hindu nationalism. 
As a political response to the erosion of 
its electoral base, the Congress had, even in 
the time of Nehru, been resorting to the 
encouragementofprecisely theseconceptions 
of Indian nationhood. Organisationally, it 
had rejected these in the pre-independence 
'period. During the Nehruvian period, this 
compromise with the secular conception of 
the nation took place primarily in response 
to the alienation of the peasantry, artisans 
and lower level employees of the ex- 
zamindari structure from the Congress, and 
dates from the time of the second general 
elections in 1957. Steps were then taken to 
-useMthe residue of a specific Muslim identity 
consciousness amongst a section of them in 
order to create a political challenge to the 
increasing left-wing influence.This .was 
apparent both in Muslim-dominated parts of 
Keala, and amongst the urban Urdu speakers 
inHyderabad. Attemptsatcasteist(or'Hindu') 
consolidation had taken place even earlier 
in the north, when the Congress connived 
at the installation of the idols in the Babri 
masjid in 1949. It is now well-accepted that 
the stubbornness of the UP Congress 
organisation on this matter, in spite of the 
intervention of the central leadership, was 
due to their electoral calculations.3 Apart 
from the very serious long-term political 
-consequences of this step, it involved an 
implicit statement about 16th century history 
(a conception of 'invaders' and of an 
indigenous population), contrary to the 
Congress's official position and to the 
postulates of the Indian Constitution. 
These kinds of political action represented 
the injection of religion into politics in a 
manner qualitatively different to Gandhi's. 
It was also to lead to the consolidation of 
apolitical identity and a leadership amongst 
Muslims, in particular, which was self- 
consciously sectarian and, more importantly, 
was accepted as such by the Congress. This 
policy is a natural corollary of the tendency 
noted earlier, of helping the consolidation of 
a 'Muslim' sectarian leadership. Over a period 
of time; this group felt able to pronounce that 
its own interests in protecting instruments of
patronage to a few fellow Muslims were, in 
fact, the interests of the religious community 
as a whole [Tyabji 1992]. 
III 
In addition, there were problems in the 
political and social sphere, requiring 
resolution. These, if not dealt with in ways 
that kept the objective of a secular unified 
India uppermost, were to lead to further 
strains on the secular polity at the political 
and social levels. Primary amongst the issues 
were the questions of subnational movements, 
which were to grow in force under the 
consolidating and crystallising role of 
commercial exchange and educational 
advance. The underlying process, though 
sometime traceable in cultural form back 
even to the pre-colonial period, took on the 
political form of a sub-national movement 
in the contemporary era. 
The process of the independence movement 
had included, within itself, the process of 
crystallisation of linguistic sub-hational 
identities [Guha 1984]. These developed at 
varying rates, ranging from the explicit 
expression amongst Tamil, Marathi and 
Bengali speaking peoples in the 19th century, 
to that of the large part of the Hindi-speaking 
India where, even today, truly clear-cut 
contours of subnational linguistic-cultural 
identity are not perceptible. The problems 
of a linguistic subnational identity formation 
ar, particularly difficult in the parts of the 
Hindi-speaking belt which were within the 
former princely states and were, therefore, 
excluded from the consciousness transforming 
processes of the independence movement. 
The first issue that confronts a programme 
of secularisation is that of ensuring that in 
the process of identity formation, the 
consciousness generated is not that of a 
sectarian past and, therefore, of a sectarian 
present. This is a complex task in those 
instances where there was political inactivity 
during the independence movement due to 
the feebleness of the people's movement. 
Here, collective memories of political 
activism are confined to the military revolts 
of the pre-colonial period, inevitably tinged 
with a communal sectarian element. 
Unlike the peasant wars and peasant-led 
revolutions of western Europe, the revolts 
of the peasantry in Maharashtra, which led 
to the rise of the maratha regimes in the 
17th, 18th and 19th centuries, did not, in 
fact, change the agrarian structure notice- 
ably. Generally, they initiated processes 
inducting isolated representatives from 
peasant castes into the zamindari structure 
[Habib 1983]. Similar features characterised 
the jat revolts in the Doab leading to the 
formation of the Bharatpur state, and 
that of the peasantry professing Sikhism 
in the Punjab [Satish Chandra 1986]. What 
was to be politically of importance was 
the parallel drawn by votaries of the con- 
cept of communal-nationalist idleology 
(basing themselves on a homogenist. 
concept of Hinduism): they identified 
the zamindar-appropriated revolts against 
the Mughal ruling class (of distinct 
denominational or ethnic origin) with 
nationalist movements against British 
colonial rule.' 
The political challenge to the Congress, 
now from the right wing of the- political 
spectrum as well as the left, began to-grow 
after 1967. Hitherto, the Congress had been 
dismissive of the question of the'political 
challenge from the left, as it had seen itself 
as the incamation of the Indian national 
movement. This challenge came to be 
articulated when the Congress, under the 
pressure of its more oligarchical supporters, 
withdrew from the pre-independence 
assurances, outlined earlier. The Congress 
under Indira Gandhi now began a process 
of reinforcing the challenge to the conception 
of the Indian nation, which had been the 
pre-independence l gacy and was incorpoated 
in the Constitution. This was evident in its 
response to the electoral alienation of the 
peasantry in UP and in Rajasthan, in 
particular. In UP, the strategy was to win 
across the upper castes through a communal 
consolidation (initiated by the Babri masjid 
events of 1949), by authoritarian measures 
against the artisans (largely Muslim) and the 
Muslim intelligentsia centred in Aligarh 
university. InRajasthan,thepolicyencouraged 
theuriderlyinganti-Muslimattitudesamongst 
the rajputs, particularly of Mewar, by 
portraying their 16th centwry battles against 
the Mughals as precursors of the 
independence movement. This was the first 
time that a political action by the Congress 
was expressly geared towards a rereading of 
Indian history and, therefore, of Indian 
nationhood.5 With Indira Gandhi's return 
to powerin 1980, political actions to reinforce 
the notion of Hinduism-as-na,tionalism 
increased. While the responses to the Sikb 
separatist movement was designed to 
institutionalise fears of the enemy within, the 
most clear-cut indication of this approach 
was during the 1983 assembly elections in 
Jammu, and the 1984 parliamentary elections. 
The pe'riod from 1984 onwards has seen 
the RSS appropriating the instruments that 
IndiraGandhi had introduced into'thepolitical 
system, of moulding both the national and 
the subnational aspirations of increasingly 
affluent rural and urban sections of tfie 
population into a consciousness of a Hindu 
view of history. Although the ideologues of 
the RSS and some of the 19th century 
nationalists had incorporated this view, the 
organisational growth of the Jan Sangh (the 
political front of the RSS) had hitherto been 
successful argely in areas where concentrations 
of refugees from west Punjab and east Bengal 
were located. Its appeal was then based on 
experiential evidence of the Hindu-Muslim 
(or Sikh-Muslim) divide. Later in the 1960s,. 
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70s and early 80s, communal consolidation 
took place in geographical pockets where 
interoccupational rivalry between the two 
religious communities could be projected in 
communal terms.The rapid growth of 
communal consciousness in the 80s was 
broughtaboutby generalisingtheexperience 
of the supposed dichotomy through the 
historical element, the 'injustices' of history, 
and more specifically, the supposedly 
barbarous acts of various ethnically distinct 
rulers of pre-colonial India. 
Itis this growth of communal consciousness 
and the projection solely of the state's 
promotion of sectarian minority interests as 
'pseudo-secularism' that has generalised the 
debate about secularism in terms of inter- 
religious balance, above all. The various 
components of structural change in the 
political economy, necessary to advance the 
process of secularisation, have very largely 
been ignored in the recent debate. There is, 
in fact, overwhelming pressure on the secular 
national approach to the history of pre- 
colonial and colonial India to which the 
Congress has responded by abdication from 
defending its heritage. It is this tgat compels 
re-examination of the more significant 
features of history, which otherwise might 
havebeen seen to be more or less satisfactorily 
resolved by the ideology incorporated in the 
national movement. 
IV 
The Delhi sultanate was certainly distinct 
from the state systems that it supplanted in 
terms of the ethnic origin of its ruling class, 
an amalgam of Turkish-Ghorian elements. 
More importantly, it differed because of the 
introduction of an administrative innovation: 
the transferagtF revenue assignment or the 
'iqta' [Habib 1992b].6 Significantly this 
system, once introduced, was used to the 
advantage of the rajput states of the north, 
and the Vijayanagar empire of the south. 
This is an important indication of the ways 
in which distinct ethnic-ideological elements 
moulded the medieval states in India, 
presumably also their successors. This created 
the basis for a composite culture rooted in 
state structures.' 
Apart from the principles' of revenue 
administration of the pre-colonial state, the 
otheraspectscritical toevaluating its possibly 
sectarian character are the recruitment policies 
forhigher administrative posts and its systems 
of civil and criminal law.' There seems little 
doubt that a succession of ruling dynasties 
professing Islam attempted to enforce the 
'shariat' in matters of both civil and criminal 
lawin India. However, this was often difficult 
to do in the face of a striking feature, the 
limited- nature of the hold of Islam over the 
mass of the population. Except on the 
peripheries of the subcontinent in Malabar, 
Kashmir, western Punjab and eastern Bengal, 
the peasantry remained unmoved by Islam. 
These areas were, in fact, ones where the 
institutions of the centralised state were the 
weakest or the most unstable. It would then 
seem that while drawing legitimacy from 
Islam, ruling political circles refrained from 
the exercise of state authority for propagating 
their faith, even to the extent of jeopardising 
the stability of their rule at some extreme 
moments of crisis [Mukhia 1990]. 
There are substantial data now available 
on the intermixing of officials of ethnically 
foreign origin, of Indian Muslims and of 
Hindus in the power structure. In terms of 
recruitment to the higheradministrative posts, 
the policy of incorporating representatives 
of the local agrarian elite ensured that as the 
Delhi sultanate expanded to become the 
Mughal empire, recruitment on a non- 
denominational basisbecamemorewidespread.9 
The regions were also integrated, and given 
identity, by t-he bureaucratic structure, 
essentially engaged in the collectiop of land 
tax and the maintenance of internal order.'0 
The interesting feature of this revenue 
administration structure is that by the time 
the Mughals took charge of the state 
apparatus, the revenue department of the 
administration was dominated by Hindu 
officials [Siddiqui 1992]. Given that the bulk 
of the bigger iqta holders were likely to be 
Muslim, this result of the policy emphasises 
a central point. It is possible to speculate 
that denominational differences between 
them and the local (Hindu) revenue officials 
probably provided the base for intercommunal 
problems in the future. 
To this a couple of other points may be 
added: the first is the absence of any sign 
of political protest in the Sanskrit literature, 
which implies the absence of any felt 
subordination of brahminical interests, either 
material or spiritual. This was in sharp contrast 
to the writings in the regional languages by 
the bhakti school [Alam Khan 1976]. Given 
the well known evidence for the emergence 
of pluralist traditions amongst the artisans 
and peasantry through the sufi and bhakti 
movements, this literature signifies peasant 
and artisan protest against the regime. And 
yet, as has been pointed out, there is no 
recorded evidence of 'inter-communal' 
conflict before the beginning of the 18th 
century, 1704 to be precise [Mukhia 1990]." 
V 
The paradoxical nature of the overtly 
quiescent Hindu-Muslim communal relations 
in the period of Indian history when the state 
was ordered accordi-ng to 'Islamic' revenue 
collection and lagal principles was followed 
by an equally complex situation during the 
subsequent period. On the one hand it has 
been noted that there was greater cultural 
uniformity in India between 1750 and 1850 
than ever before (or since) [Mujeeb 1967; 
Goetz 1938]. On-theth4er, as noted earlier, 
once the first recorded instance of communal 
tension arose in 1704, the entire 18th and 
19th centuries saw many cases of communal 
tension and violence [Bayly 1985]. 
Broadly speaking, there seem to havebeen 
two forms of conflict that reflected themselves 
in terms of inter-communal assertion and 
teAsion. The first were those cases where 
the regional states, successors to the Moghul 
empire, attempted to redefine the balance in 
cultural-religious observances within the 
boundaries of an accepted framework of 
religious compromise, while otherwise 
continuing to encourage the growth of 
religious syncretism. In Mysore, forinstance, 
Tipu Sultan combined attacks on the culture 
of the Kerala Nair aristocracy and the 
Portuguese and Syrian Christian population 
of the Malabar coast, with patronage of 
temples and inclusion of the brahmins and 
the traditional landlord communities in his 
civil and military bureaucracies respectively 
[Bayly 19851.12 
The second form of conflict arose from 
economic causes, principally over the issue 
of land in the rural areas, and the rise to 
economic supremacy of traders and money- 
lenders leading to urban land sales, across the 
religious communities [Bayly 1985]. Further, 
these often took place under conditions where 
the ownership right was still ambiguous, as 
in the case of 'waqf land [Powers 1989]. 
Finally, in those cases where Iritish rule had 
consolidated, their role in the political process 
leading to the construction of a modern 
communal identity has also to be noted 
[Pandey 1992; Prior 1993; Freitag 19781. 
As the British empire in India increased 
its geographic spread, so did its responsibility 
for ensuring at least overt inter-communal 
amity, as the lives, of distinct ethnic 
communities were increasingly integrated 
by the economic processes u.nderway, 
particularly urbanisation.'3 
VI 
The 18th century was a period of localised 
inter-communal conflict, largely the result of 
the social and economic rivalry of groups 
distinguished by ethnic and religious 
differences. The 19th century saw the 
expression of a new form of political 
ideology which, by contrasting current 
non-Hindu social, economic and cultural 
conditions with that of a Hindu mythical 
past, represented one trend in the evolving 
concept of the Indian nation [Tucker 1976; 
Harvey 1986]. What gave force to this 
political tendency, represented by Swami 
Dayanand Saraswati in Punjab in the first 
half of the 19th century, and by'Tilak and 
Vivekananda in Maharashtra and Bengal 
respectively, was. the appropriation of the 
mythic power of the history of the zamindari 
revolts against the Mughals and its 
transformation into the precursors of a 
national movement destined to restore Hindu 
rule in India [Rothermund 1971]. 
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At about the same time there evolved, from 
isolated attempts at the propagation of an 
Islamic practice purified of extraneous 
elements, the growth of the two-nation 
theory-that Hindus and Muslims, viewed 
as blocks, formed distinct national elements 
[Habib 1961]. The third stream worked 
towards the creation of national consciousness 
on the basis of the empirical reality: several 
centuries of inter-ethnic accommodation 
described earlier; the history of communal 
strife of the colonial period and, above all, 
the fact of colonial rule. Arising at the close 
of the 19th century, it has been the most 
creative concept on which future social and 
economic developments could be based, 
largely shaped by the national movement. 
As the national independence movement 
began to grow in strength, particularly during 
the phase of the 'extremist' predominance 
in Congress'politics, and the Gandhian period, 
levers of administrative intervention by the 
British were increasingly used. This was not 
only to keep the balance in local situations, 
but to encourage political movements based 
on sectarian concepts of Indian nationhood, 
that of the Hindu Rashtra, atYd Muslim 
League's two-nation theory [Brennan 1984; 
Singh 1985]. 
It was in this political context that a serious 
miscalculation was made, both collectively 
by.the&Congress and by the leading individual, 
figures of the national movement, including 
Gandhi, Nehru and Azad. As has been 
mentioned earlier, they assumed that the 
increasing incidence of communal intolerance 
was the result of imperial rule and of its 
encouragementofdivisivetendencies. Inthe 
context of an ongoing mass movements, and 
the British Indian government's attempts to 
counterpoise them with concessions to 
sectional demands, the 'artificial' nature of 
the inter-communal divide may have been 
the most apparent. The end result of this 
attitude, however, was that the entire course 
of the national movement was allowed to 
pass without any attempt being made to 
further the processes of social and cultural 
integration, to extend it beyond the residue 
of the traditionally formed process of inter- 
communal interaction. The consequence of 
this, in turn, was that with independence, and 
the beginning of the period of planned 
industrialisation, there was the negative 
political legacy of nearly two centuries of 
cohabitation of urban dwellers whose ethnic 
and religious identities remained distinct. 
These may have been submerged by the mass 
actions which accompanied the independence 
movement, but they had in no way been 
consciously modified to accord with a society 
in transition towards incorporating a modern 
secular industrial culture. 
VII 
With partition and the formation of 
Pakistan, the Muslim League was able to 
claim the fruits of its theory. of a Muslim 
and a Hindu nation existing in colonial India. 
Its counterpart. the theory of the Hindu Rastra 
although actively propagated below the 
surface of political life, faced considerable 
ideological opposition afterthe assassination 
of Gandhi, and was not to be effectively 
resurrected until the 1980s. It is the events 
of the post-independence period that 
crystallise all problems of the interaction of 
remnants of past problems with the present. 
Earlier sections of the paper have dealt at 
varying length with historical phases in the 
development of the socio-political identity 
of India, in terms of the structure of the state 
and of society. The rationale for an historical 
approach is based on the understanding that 
each phase of history has generated distinct 
issues of intercommunal relations which need 
to be resolved in the process of the formation 
of a secular Indian society. Implicit in the 
argument has been the fact that each major 
stage, the pre-colonial, the colonial, and the 
post-colonial up to the 1980s, has found that 
problems accumulated during the earlier 
phase have remained unresolved. This has 
been because either the priorities of the 
wielders of state power in the succeeding 
phase have been distinct to those of their 
predecessors or, as in thecaseof the nationalist 
leaders, they have viewed the problem as 
entirely political and imposed from outside. 
.To recapitulate the argument: failures at 
the political level (decentralisation and the 
formation of political units appropriate for 
the expression of regional aspirations), at the 
economic level (agrarian reforms, measures 
to extend irrigation and so on) and in the 
sphere of unification and modernisation of 
systems of personal law prevented the 
consolidation of a secular society in India. 
Simultaneously. the lack of attention to primary 
education implied that the process of 
secularisation envisaged though the growth 
of the scientific temper remained an accretion, 
rather than a consciousness transforming 
process. As the Congress' inegalitarian 
economic policies furthered its alienation 
from the people, the strategy adopted was 
to draw in disaffected groups by appeals to 
their religious identity. 
The ef'ficacy of this strategy in (he short 
term led to its appropriation by the RSS. 
which managed to extend its electoral support 
f'ar beyond its 'normal' constituency. Not only 
did this development lead to the popularisation 
of the Hindu rashtra theory of Indian 
nationhood, it also pushed into the back 
ground the political and economic issues 
underlying the process of secularisation. 
Notes 
[Presented at the Seminar on Ethnicity and 
Nation Building organised by the Centre for 
South and South East Asian Studies of the 
University of Madras, and USEFI in March 1994. 
Meena Radhakrishna has made a substantial 
contribution, intellectually and editorially, to 
this paper.] 
1 The relationship between uncertain prospects 
for rain and religiosity is well brought out in 
the following quotation. "In an agricultural 
society, rain brings life, work, happiness, 
prosperity and plenty, and occasionally, misery 
and destruction. But men cannot live without 
it; it dominates their lives, dictates the terms 
under which they live, regulates the seasons 
of hard work and lazy indolence. It controls 
the timing of weddings and festivals, gives 
people their faiths and their beliefs anid their 
superstitions. It is their eternal protector, 
benevolent master, their blind avenger of 
fate... (p 5) 
"If the prices are high, it-is the fault of the 
townspeople. If the taxes are high, it is the 
fault of the government. But if there is no 
rain, it is fate. 'God is against us,' they say, 
'It is beyond our hands; it is fate'. And people 
find consolation in such a statement. That 
is their philosophy and that is their religion, 
for they know no other. They merely turn 
to the heavens and ask, 'How long, oh god, 
how long are we to suffer?"' (p 6) [Sreenivasan 
1980] 
2 In any case, one noticeable gap in the per- 
spective of an advance towards a secular 
society was the absence of an organic link 
between higher educational expansion and 
prirnary and secondary education. It was only 
on the basis of the satisfactory growth of these 
that specialised higher education could lead 
to the growth of the scientific temper. 
3 These were that this indifference would win 
the support of the politically dominant upper 
castes, and reduce the electoral prospects for 
the Socialist Party candidate, Acharya Narenda 
15ev, in the assembly elections of the early 
1950s [Chaube 1990]. 
4 It is important to note here that major figures 
of Indian economic nationalism seem also to 
have been unable to rise above a view of 
history centred on the ethnicity or religion of 
the ruling classes [Sudhir Chandra 1985]. 
5 It is instructive to note the contrast with the 
mobilisation of the UP peasantry by--Charan 
Singh. In spite of the historical experience 
of the Bharatpur and Deeg states in opposition 
to Mughal rule, no attempt was made to 
highlight religious denominational differences 
as a mobilising symbol. 
6 The principal feature of this system consisted 
of an arrangement by which the management 
and appropriation of the revenues of distinct 
territorial units lay collectively with the 
members of the ruling class, under the control 
of a central authority. Individuals holding 
assignments were not allowed to acquire 
hereditary rights over the regions in their 
jurisdiction. During the succeeding centuries 
of Lodhi and Mughal rule, the system changed 
in a variety of ways, both affecting and defining 
the degree of political centralisation. How- 
ever, the principal underlying the system did 
not change until the introduction of the 
British colonial regime. This principal lay in 
the institution of state property in land, and 
its obverse, the absence of private landed 
property. Equally significant for the purposes 
of this paper is the ideological basis for the 
concept of the iqta. It has been argued that 
while Islamic law had a well-defined concept 
of pnivate property in land, the practice of 
Islamic states was heavily influenced by the 
institutions of the nomadic societies of cen- 
tral and western Asia, which were also the 
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core areas of these states. These nomadic 
societies, with their concept of the tribal 
possession of territory, are said to be the 
sources of the iqta system of revenue admin- 
istration, brought to India by the Ghorian 
dynasties [Athar Ali 1992]. 
7 Both of these were 'Islamic' polities in the 
sense tkut they accepted its traditions in critical 
matters such as taxation and state property. 
This may have been due to the efficiency with 
which the system worked in the interests of 
regional sections of the ruling classes, such 
as the rajputs, and the realisation that while 
its origin may have been Islamic, its utility 
was universal. Significant in this context is 
the reference in the Guru Granth Sahib with- 
out any hostility or rancour, to the 'Muslim' 
character of the state [Mukhia 1990], 
8 The imposition of a denominational system 
of jurisprudence on a society in which mul- 
tiple faiths coexist has been termed, in fact, 
as one of the chief features of a theocracy. 
The other is the exercise of state power for 
propagation of the state religion, the efficacy 
of this policy obviously made visible in terms 
of conversions. 
9 The rural elite were defined by the structure 
of rural society, which consisted of a pyramid 
based on the village as a unit of social pro- 
duction. The two social groups involved in 
agricultural production were the cultivators, 
sharecroppers, or tenants-at-will, usually of 
low status in the social order, and the 
zamindars, whose status was substantially 
higher. The village level zamindars were 
linked by social ties to others, these linkages 
usually covering about 30-40 villages in all, 
An elder of the group or jati, linked in this 
way, was variously known as the Raja, Rai 
or Chaudhury of the region [Habib 1974; 
Kumar 1983]. 
10 The local unit of the bureaucracy was usually 
centred on the 'qasbah' or township, which 
served as a market and a religious and cultural 
centre of varying importance. 
11 Friction might be particularly pronounced in 
the qasbah where issues of underlying eco- 
nomic rivalry could easily take on. inter- 
denominational forms. 
12 The explanation for these contradictory 
tendencies may lie in the imperatives of state 
responses to socio-cultural consolidation. It 
has been argued that during the pre-colonial 
period, regionalised linguistic-cultural 
patterns, "communities of culture" emerged 
[Guha 1984]. These processes, in some cases, 
were encouraged by the patronage of the 
regional states. In most cases the autonomous 
kingdoms that arose with the decline of the 
Mughal empire. were not the result of peasant 
revolts against the prevailing (generalised) 
zamindar dominated agrarian structure but 
assertions of zamindari independence from 
the Mughal state [Satish Chandra 1973, 1986]. 
Encouragement of syncretist tendencies may 
have been with the intention of forming a 
regional identity. The adjustment of the 
prevailing equilibrium between the 
conventions of one religion-and another, on 
the other hand, were designed to strengthen 
the local zamindari base, in favour of the 
section with the predominant denominational 
affiliation. 
13 The economic processes themselves led to 
changes in the economic and political balance 
of power, between specific occupational 
groups, such as- traders and the traditional 
rural elite. These changes took on a comnmu- 
nal identificaltion when the occupational 
groups were also distinct in terms of religious 
denomination. It has been argued that within 
a context of religious tolerance, there was an 
implicit balance between the symbols of 
religious display of the major religious com- 
munities [Prior 1993]. The precedence that 
would be given to the observance of 
Moharrum, or to Ramnavami or Dasehra re- 
spectively, was an index of the pre-eminence 
of brie or the other community in an urban 
context. The growth of the movement in 
veneration of Ram was itself a striking feature 
of 19th century north India, which signified 
the growth of. a tradition of the open and 
public practice of Hinduism. This, in turn, 
provided the basis for competing claims on 
the use of public spaces. 
The colonial administration's attempt to 
resolve the contest over -precedence lay 
through the norm of the 'custom'. It was the 
procedure to determine, through local infor- 
mants, the customary practice in vogue be- 
fore the formalisation of colonial rule. It was 
then decried that this practice was to be the 
basis for all administrative decisioils involv- 
ing procedures: in terms of route selection for 
processions, of the overt or covert sanction 
to cow-slaughter. of the playing of music in 
processions along specific routes, and so on. 
The purpose of codifying the custom-as-norm 
was to ensure that administrative decisions 
taken at different points of time were con- 
sistent. This entirely overlooked the funda- 
mental fact that "custom" was an inaccurate 
guide to a convention which changed as social 
and economic change took place. It appears, 
in fact, that a great deal of the intercommunal 
tension and violence of the colonial period 
was itself due to the inflexible nature of 
administrative decisions based on the concept 
of an unchanging custom [Prior 1993; 
Masselos 1976, 1982]. 
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